Inactive

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION FOR THE Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) Canteen Cap UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 41 U.S.C. 1903 1. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Troop ... JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION FOR THE Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) Canteen Cap UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 41 U.S.C. 1903 1. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Troop Support, Clothing and Textiles Supply Chain, is the contracting activity. 2. The action being approved is the ability to solicit for DLA requirements on another than full and open competition basis. 3. Following are the quantities and estimated price to meet requirements for the : National Stock Number (NSN), Quantity, and Estimated Unit Price: 8465?01?529?9800 33,000 each $ Estimated dollar value of the proposed award: $ each 4. The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition for this action is 41 United States Code (U.S.C.) 1903 special emergency procurement authority as implemented by FAR 13.5. The CBRN Canteen Cap is deemed to be available only from the original source for this follow?on contract for the production of this highly specialized component and it is likely that award to any other source would result in (A) Substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition; or (B) Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements. 5. A sole?source fixed quantity contract to Avon Protection Systems, Inc. (APS) is necessary to procure the CBRN Canteen Cap. The Canteen Cap was developed with the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 masks as systems to provide protection against exposure to CBRN agents. At the subsystem level, each of the required components such as the CBRN Canteen Cap provide a critical function to the mask system. If a single component does not meet the required capabilities, a mask system failure could occur and lead to serious injury or death. APS is the sole producer of the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 chemical biological mask systems and a majority of the system components, to include the CBRN Canteen Cap. These masks provide CBRN protection and only masks produced by APS meet the Government’s requirements. These masks are separate items from the CBRN suits and or other equipment. The Government only has limited data rights to the contractor drawings. APS has not shown interest in selling the full detailed Technical Data Package (TDP) for each mask system to the Government. On 27 November 2019, the Contract Specialist emailed APS requesting to purchase the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 detailed TDPs. APS replied they are not interested in selling the TDP in an email dated 16 December 2019. 2 The Government currently only has limited top level drawings, system performance specifications, Quality Assurance Provisions (QAPs), and Special Packing Instructions (SPl) that may be used to procure these mask systems and components; however, this collection of documents are insufficient for competition because they lack the necessary technical details. These missing technical details include interface dimensions, material requirements, and component level verification requirements. Without these missing technical details, the Government cannot guarantee the systems will function as required by the Warfighter. In 2000, the Government competed the M50, M51, and M53 systems for a development contract. The Government selected the APS's prototype as having the best potential to meet the Government's performance requirements. Extensive testing was conducted at the system level to determine the masks’ protection capability. This testing included the following: chemical agent testing, protection factor testing, field operational testing, and testing of interoperability with other systems. The Government’s effort to develop a competitive TDP for the JSGPM mask systems and spare components would result in significant duplication of cost, approximately $, which will not be recovered through competition by the Government. Table 2 below outlines the cost to reverse engineer the items: Table 1 ? Estimated Cost Any effort to procure the components and systems on this contract competitively while ensuring the parts meet critical requirements, would require either the purchase of the detailed TDP from APS or conducting a reverse engineering effort. Since APS is not willing to sell the rights to their TDP, reverse engineering these components and systems would require the following steps: Step 1 – Reverse Engineering/Design. During this stage, it is required to conduct research and development efforts such as identify materials, design prototype molds, produce prototype materials, perform internal conformance testing, and conduct an analysis of alternatives. Upon reaching the appropriate technology readiness level the Government would need to invest in production molds, verify production process repeatability, and prepare for component testing and evaluation in accordance with the performance specifications identified in Step 1. This step results in costs of approximately $. Step Cost ($M) 1. Reverse Engineering/Design $ 2. Government Technical Data Update $ 3. Component Test and Evaluation $ 4. System Test and Evaluation $ TOTAL $ 3 Step 2 – Government Technical Data Update. The current Government technical data is not adequate for a competitive procurement. Each component and system level performance specification will need to be updated to include the appropriate performance requirements necessary to support competitive procurement and ensure Warfighter safety. This step also includes identifying lessons learned from previous failure mechanisms. The effort to update Government technical data will cost approximately $. Step 3 – Component Test and Evaluation. Upon completing research and development efforts the Government would be required to validate the design using the previously established product and process configuration baseline. Production representative samples of the components would be subjected to the testing described in the component level performance specifications such as material properties, deterioration, and mean time between failure, reliability, environmental, battlefield contaminants, and long term storage. This effort will cost approximately $. Step 4 – System Test and Evaluation. After successfully meeting all of the component level performance requirements, the Government would be required to test the design solution in the JSGPM mask systems. These tests would be defined by the system level performance specifications and include environmental (salt fog, transportation, drop, vibration, electromagnetic interference etc.), protection factor, Simulant Agent Resistance Test Manikin (SMARTMAN), and long term storage testing. Agent testing alone would cost approximately. As described in Table 1 above, awarding a competitive contract for the components and systems would result in the duplication of costs of approximately $ that is not expected to be recovered through competition. Additionally, qualifying a new source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Government’s requirements. Table 2 below outlines the timeframe to qualify an additional source. Table 2 ? Estimated Schedule Step 1 – Reverse Engineering/Design. The reverse engineering/design phase for components manufactured using soft rubbers requires multiple stages, including the development of Step Schedule (Months) 1. Reverse Engineering/Design 48 – 60 2. Government Technical Data Update 18 3. Component Test and Evaluation 18 4. System Test and Evaluation 24 TOTAL 108 – 120 4 material formulations, mold design and fabrication, and process design. Based on these factors a single component would take approximately 12 – 18 months for a contractor with expertise in soft rubber design and manufacture. It is reasonable to assume that not all of the components of a mask system can be designed simultaneously. Therefore, these systems would require a combination of sequential, iterative, and parallel design processes to realize a complete system design. Based on the number of unique parts and multi?system compatibility requirements, it is estimated that this initial design phase could take approximately 36 – 48 months. Maturation of the assembly process necessary to produce these items is estimated to take an additional 12 months; this is especially important as mask leakage points are often the result of improper assembly of components and result in system failures. For comparison, there have been multiple 24 – 36 months Operating and Supply Cost Reduction (OSCR) efforts to reverse engineer components contained in these mask systems that were unsuccessful. In summary, the total duration for reverse engineering/design is estimated to take 48 – 60 months. Step 2 – Government Technical Data Update. Current quality assurance provisions are based solely on Avon?owned drawings. Assuming every component is completely reverse engineered, it is estimated that creating detailed drawings suitable for production and updating quality assurance requirements to appropriately test and accept the new designs, would take approximately 18 months. An alternative approach would be for the Government to convert the current sole source requirements into competitive, performance?based specifications. It is estimated that this approach would take an equivalent amount of time as previously defined for creating detailed drawings. It is important to note that all quality assurance requirements must ensure backward compatibility with current mask systems. Step 3 – Component Test and Evaluation. After successful component design, each component must be evaluated in accordance with Government requirements using certified test equipment. A typical First Article Test (FAT) of an individual component takes approximately 6 – 12 months, assuming no design changes are necessary. Agent testing must be completed at certified Government laboratories. It is not unusual for the wait time for agent testing to be several months and upwards of a year due to limited capacity. Considering the number of components associated with these systems it is reasonable to expect a minimum of 18 months for component testing. Step 4 – System Test and Evaluation. FAT for similar systems has taken approximately 12 – 24 months, assuming no changes to the design. To reiterate, agent testing must be completed at certified Government laboratories with limited capacity. System agent testing uses specific test equipment known as SMARTMAN; there are only two Government laboratories approved for SMARTMAN testing and the lead time is typically 9 – 12 months. Similar system FATs have been historically difficult to pass. For example, the M52 Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability Mask (JSCESM) took approximately 5 years to meet system FAT requirements. 5 Assuming all testing is successful, a conservative estimate to complete FAT on the Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) systems is expected to take at least 24 months. As described in Table 2 above, qualifying a new vendor would result in an unacceptable delay of 108 – 120 months. The delay would be caused by lengthy testing and approval from the services and DLA of the new item. The urgent need for this item is due to back orders building with purchases requisitions of over 33,000 units as of January 2020. In addition, this item should have a safety level of six (6) months of stock. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a new source could produce items that meet the Government's requirements. 6. There is no plan to obtain competition for this contractual action on the prime contractor level for the reasons stated above in section 5. Notices required by FAR 5.201 shall be published, and any proposals received shall be considered. 7. There are no plans to increase competition for the CBRN Canteen Cap due to the aforementioned unique nature of this sole source requirement. The Government does not own or have rights to technical data adequate for competition. The Government previously undertook OSCR efforts to reverse engineer the various components, and create a competitive Technical Data Package (TDP). Attempts to reverse engineer the items were not successful due to critical features that were difficult to define. These critical features ensure proper system interface and function. The Government suspended further efforts to reverse engineer the components due to the high risk of manufacturing parts that fail to meet system requirements. The criticality of the items’ dimensions, material properties, and interface requirements cannot be overstated – if a single component on this list does not meet the required capabilities, then a mask system failure could occur and lead to serious injury or death. 8. A Sources Sought Notice was posted on Fed Biz Opps on March 18, 2020 for the fixed quantity of the CBRN Canteen Cap identified within this document. The posting closed April 17, 2020; APS was the only contractor to respond. In addition the Engineering Support Activity, CCDC Chemical Biological Center along with ACCDTA conducted market research on August 2019 in accordance with FAR 10.002(b)(2) in relation to the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 mask systems regarding capabilities to meet customer requirements. The market research included contacting knowledgeable individuals in Government, DoD database searches in Product Data Management System (PDMS)/IHS Haystack/Joint Acquisition Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Knowledge Systems (JACKS), and reviewing online product literature of similar manufacturers. Results of the market research indicates that other sources may have the capability to produce similar items, however, the Government does not have sufficient technical data to ensure Government 6 requirements are met. Without accurate Government owned detailed technical data, validation and acceptance of any parts would require extensive testing and verification, causing a serious schedule delay and duplication of costs. A competitive procurement is not possible with the current technical data. 9. The ESA has reported that to date, no other sources have written to express an interest. 10. In accordance with FAR 5.102(a)(6) when an acquisition contains brand name specifications, the contracting officer shall include with the solicitation the justification or documentation required by 6.302?1(c), 13.106?1(b), or 13.501, redacted as necessary in accordance with FAR 6.305. 10. In accordance with DGPA 13.003?P (2), Special Emergency Procurement Authority (SEPA) the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) for purchases made within the United States is $750,000.00 to facilitate the defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological attack. An e?mail dated January 28, 2020 from from DLA Troop Support Policy Office confirms this increased SAT for a CBRN item. In accordance with FAR 13.501(a)(2)(i) and the Contract Quality Management Plan (CQMP) dated August 2019, review and approvals for Justification & Approvals below the SAT is at the Procurement Contracting Officer level. 11. As the Contracting Officer, I hereby certify that the justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief will serve as approval. I hereby determine the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable base on price analysis, including favorable comparison to previous award price and published commercial price list from APS. ___4?20?20_______ _____________________________ Date Jennifer Scarpello Contracting Officer Individual Equipment 7 13.501 Special documentation requirements. (a) Sole source (including brand name) acquisitions. (1) Acquisitions conducted under simplified acquisition procedures are exempt from the requirements in part 6. However, contracting officers must— (i) Conduct sole source acquisitions, as defined in 2.101, (including brand name) under this subpart only if the need to do so is justified in writing and approved at the levels specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this section; (ii) Prepare sole source (including brand name) justifications using the format at 6.303?2, modified to reflect that the procedures in FAR subpart 13.5 were used in accordance with 41 U.S.C. 1901 or the authority of 41 U.S.C. 1903; (iii) Make publicly available the justifications (excluding brand name) required by 6.305(a) within 14 days after contract award or in the case of unusual and compelling urgency within 30 days after contract award, in accordance with 6.305 procedures at paragraphs (b), (d), (e), and (f); and (iv) Make publicly available brand name justifications with the solicitation, in accordance with 5.102(a)(6). (2) Justifications and approvals are required under this subpart for sole?source (including brand?name) acquisitions or portions of an acquisition requiring a brand?name. If the justification is to cover only the portion of the acquisition which is brand?name, then it should so state; the approval level requirements will then only apply to that portion. (i) For a proposed contract exceeding $150,000, but not exceeding $700,000, the contracting officer's certification that the justification is accurate and complete to the best of the contracting officer's knowledge and belief will serve as approval, unless a higher approval level is established in accordance with agency procedures.